Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson, University of California, San Diego.
Material type: TextPublisher: New York : W. W. Norton & Company, [2013]Edition: 2nd EditionDescription: xv, 404 pages : illustrations ; 24 cmContent type:- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 9788130915999
- 330.015193 23
Item type | Current library | Call number | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | Library, Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB) Reserve Shelf | 330.015193 W3371s 2010 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 01 | Not For Loan | 025225 |
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327.5491054 J19b Bangladesh, India and Pakistan : International relations and regional tensions in South Asia / | 327 I61 2012 International politics : concepts, theories and issues / | 330 B889e 2010 Essentials of economics / | 330.015193 W3371s 2010 Strategy : an introduction to game theory / | 330.91732 S77427m Managing Urbanization, Climate Change and Disasters in South Asia / | 330.9549205 B2161 2014 Bangladesh economic review 2013/ | 330.9549205 B2161 2014 Bangladesh economic review 2013/ |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Preface -- Introduction -- Representations and basic assumptions -- The extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Analyzing behavior in static settings -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location, partnership, and social unrest -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Analyzing behavior in dynamic settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Sequential rationality and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Information -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation -- Appendices -- Index.