TY  - BOOK
AU  - Sokolski,Henry D.
ED  - Army War College (U.S.).
ED  - Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
TI  - Taming the next set of strategic weapons threats
SN  - 1584872438
U1  - 355.0217 22
PY  - 2006///
CY  - [Carlisle Barracks, PA]
PB  - Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
KW  - Nuclear nonproliferation
KW  - Nuclear arms control
KW  - Nuclear weapons
KW  - Forecasting
KW  - National security
KW  - United States
N1  - "June 2006."; "Features research the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned ..." -- p. v; Includes bibliographical references; Introduction -- I. Life in a well-armed crowd -- 1. Alternative proliferation and alliance futures in East Asia / Stephen J. Kim -- 2. Proliferation in the Middle East: who is next after Iran? / Patrick Clawson -- 3. Nuclear 1914: the next big worry / Henry D. Sokolski -- II. New proliferation worries -- 4. Missile defense cooperation and the missile technology control regime / Mitchell Kugler -- 5. A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors / Victor Gilinsky -- 6. Coping with biological threats after SARS / Alan P. Zelicoff -- III. What can be done -- 7. New missiles and models for cooperation / Dennis M. Gormley and Richard Speier -- 8. German nuclear policy / Ernst Urich von Weizäcker -- 9. President Bush's global nonproliferation policy: seven more steps / Henry D. Sokolski; gsg; Electronic version also available on the SSI website
N2  - Missile defense and unmanned air vehicle related technologies, are proliferating for a variety of perfectly defensive and peaceful civilian applications. This same know-how can be used to defeat U.S. and allied air and missile defenses in new ways that are far more stressful than the existing set of ballistic missile threats. Unfortunately, the Missile Technology Control Regime is not yet optimized to cope with these challenges. Nuclear technologies have become much more difficult to control since new centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities and relatively small fuel reprocessing plants can now be built and hidden much more readily than nuclear fuel-making plants that were operating when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the bulk of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections procedures were first devised 30 or more years ago. This volume is designed to highlight what might happen if these emerging threats go unattended and how best to mitigate them
ER  -